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Are a material object, such as a statue, and its constituting matter, the clay, 
parts of one another? One wouldn't have thought so, and yet a number of 
philosophers have argued that they are. I review the arguments for this 
surprising claim showing how they all fail. I then consider two arguments 
against the view concluding that there are both pre-theoretical and 




It's a familiar tale: the statue of a woman and the (portion of) clay from which it is made 
appear to have different properties, whether these be aesthetic, historical, mereological, 
modal, or sortal. Hence, by Leibniz’s Law, they are distinct objects.1 For instance, one might 
argue that whereas the statue can survive the destruction of some small part of the clay, the 
clay cannot. And what goes for the statue and the clay, goes for humans and the collections of 
molecules from which they are composed, and more generally for all artefacts and organisms, 
and their constituting matter. 
 
                                                          
1
 In what follows I suppress 'portion of', but take 'the clay’ as I use it here to refer to a material object, a portion 
of clay, rather than to some stuff or to a plurality of things. 
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These arguments, then, lead us to the initially surprising claim that two material objects can 
coincide. In particular, the above modal considerations support 
 
Moderate Pluralism: There can be distinct material objects that are coincident at every 
time (at which they exist).2 
 
Assuming that Moderate Pluralism is true, we can ask what relations hold between coincident 
material objects such as the statue and the clay?3 Many moderate pluralists claim that the clay 
constitutes the statue. Some moderate pluralists, notably Cotnoir (2010, 2013, 2016; see also 
Cotnoir and Bacon 2012), Hawthorne (2006), Hovda (2013), and Thomson (1983, 1988), 
have argued that the statue and the clay are mutual parts, endorsing 
 
                                                          
2
 Fine (2003: 197-198) distinguishes between spatial and material coincidence: x and y spatially coincide when 
they occupy identical spatial regions, whereas they materially coincide when they share identical underlying 
matter. Fine himself thinks that spatial and material coincidence are independent of one another, for a loaf of 
bread and the bread from which it is made are materially, but not spatially coincident, whereas a water-logged 
loaf and the loaf that is water-logged are spatially but not materially coincident (cf. Doepke, 1982: 16). As the 
example of the clay and the statue shows, we can often ignore the distinction between spatial and material 
coincidence. I shall flag below where the distinction is important, but the reader can bear in mind that it will be 
material coincidence that I’ll focus on when the distinction matters. 
3
 The arguments for Moderate Pluralism have been resisted. One might claim that the difference in our 
willingness to apply a single predicate to the clay and to the statue does not reveal a difference in the properties 
they instantiate (Lewis, 1986; Noonan, 1991). Other positions in logical space are available (see Hawley, 2002; 
Rea, 1997; and Sider, 2001 for surveys). Although I accept the modal argument for Moderate Pluralism, we can 
bracket the truth of Moderate Pluralism here and consider what relations hold between the statue and the clay, 
assuming that they are distinct coincident objects. 
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Mutual Parthood: if x and y are distinct coincident objects, then x is a part of y and y 
is a part of x. 
 
But whilst the former claim is an intuitive description of the case (above I talked naturally of 
artefacts and organisms, and their constituting matter), Mutual Parthood is, I think, not a 
natural description of the case and stands opposed to the following two more intuitive views: 
 




Constituting Parthood: if x is the matter that constitutes y, then x is a part of y, and y 
is not a part of x.5 
 
Defenders of Mutual Parthood, however, claim that their view has numerous advantages. 
First, Mutual Parthood is claimed to be the only view consistent with an acceptable 
mereology of coincident objects (§3-§5), for instance being entailed by 
 
Strong Supplementation: if x is not a part of nor identical to y, then x or some part of 
it does not overlap y, 
 
given an auxiliary assumption, and also, for objects that are spatially coincident, by 
                                                          
4
 This is Lowe’s (2003) view. 
5
 This view is defended by Doepke (1982), Fine (2008), Goodman (ms), Gilmore (Forthcoming), Koslicki 




Strong Inclusion: If the space occupied by x is part of or identical to the space 
occupied by y, then x is part of or identical to y. 
 
 
Second, Mutual Parthood affords a satisfactory explanation of how material objects can 
coincide and also allows us to give an explication of the constitution relation (§6-§7). 
 
Here I assess the case for and against Mutual Parthood compared to the above two rival 
views.6 But before I do so, let me briefly state three assumptions about parthood that I’ll be 
making. There are many notions of parthood in the literature and so there are multiple ways 
                                                          
6
 These positions do not exhaust the possibilities. First, the converse position of Constituting Parthood is 
omitted: if x is the matter that constitutes y, then y is a part of x, and x is not a part of y. This view seems 
particularly implausible and has not to my knowledge been defended in the literature. Second, Constituting 
Parthood is limited to the matter that constitutes an object. On Doepke's (1982, 1986) view we can have a 
hierarchy of objects with objects at lower levels constituting all of the objects above, so that a single object can 
be constituted by multiple objects. This is because he thinks that what it is for x to constitute y is for x to have 
some accidental property in virtue of which y exists. So, the alloy constitutes a piece of alloy in virtue of being 
unified, and the piece of alloy (and the alloy itself) constitute a statue in virtue of standing in some appropriate 
intentional-causal relation to an artist. Fine (2003: 206) conceives of constitution differently: “it is not a piece of 
alloy but only the alloy itself that can properly be said to constitute or make up the statue”. In any case, Doepke 
himself appears to reject the generalization of Constituting Parthood, namely that if x constitutes y, then x is a 
part of y, but y is not a part of x, because he thinks that a person’s body constitutes that person and that a person 
and their body are mutual parts. Third, the views above other than Mutual Parthood leave open the mereological 
relations that obtain between coincidents that do not stand in the constitution relation. For example, Doepke 
(1986) argues that there could be a statue and a landmark, each constituted by the same portion of stone, but 
neither of which constitutes the other. The possibility of coincidents that do not stand in the constitution relation 
to one another makes Mutual Parthood even more implausible, I think. 
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of understanding Mutual Parthood, but I here want to abstract away from these issues as far 
as is possible. But I will understand ‘part’, hence Mutual Parthood, in the following ways. 
 
First, I am using ‘part’ in what I take to be our ordinary way, so that, prima facie at least, 
parthood is non-reflexive, although I don’t assume that it is irreflexive. I do this because 
some of the arguments discussed below rest on intuitive considerations. Nothing seems to be 
lost by initially thinking of parthood as non-reflexive, since we can simply introduce identity 
explicitly when it is relevant. 
 
Those who take a reflexive parthood relation, ≤, as primitive can try to capture our ordinary 
notion of part in terms of a non-reflexive notion of part, <, defined in one of two ways: 
 
 Non-reflexive Parthood 1: x < y =df (x ≤ y) ∧ (x ≠ y) 
Non-reflexive Parthood 2: x < y =df (x ≤ y) ∧ ~(x ≤ y). 
 
The statue and the clay cannot be mutual parts in the sense of < defined by Non-reflexive 
Parthood 2, however, so this definition will not suit our purposes. The sense of < defined by 
Non-reflexive Parthood 1, however, allows that the statue and the clay are mutual parts (<). 
But if we accept Mutual Parthood and Non-reflexive Parthood 1, then  < is irreflexive and 
fails to be transitive.7 
 
Alternatively, we might take our ordinary notion of part to be a non-reflexive relation not 
defined in terms of a reflexive one. Following Cotnoir and Bacon (2012: 191), we could take 
                                                          
7
 That is, if x < y =df x ≤ y and x≠y, then < is not transitive when x and y are mutual parts, since if x < y and y < 
x, then by transitivity x < x.  But that is clearly impossible given our definition. So < is not transitive. 
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this relation to be transitive and hence treat it as not irreflexive. A final approach says that, 
despite appearances our ordinary notion of parthood is in fact reflexive. 
 
Second, as I want to be neutral between the above approaches, I do not assume that parthood 
is transitive. I do assume, however, 
 
Restricted Transitivity: if x is a part of y, then for all z not identical to y, if z is a part 
of x, then z is part of y. 
 
This does not beg any questions, since advocates of Mutual Parthood, such as Thomson and 
Cotnoir, accept Restricted Transitivity. 
 
Third, I shall be using ‘part’ in a univocal and topic neutral way. This seems to be the way in 
which most mereologists use the term, but in any case it does not beg the question against 
pluralists concerning part-whole who think that there are different ways in which one object 
can be a part of another, e.g. the way in which a pint of milk is part of a quart of milk, versus 
the way in which the letter type ‘c’ is part of the word type ‘cat’. That is because pluralists 
like Fine (2010: 580) may define a general notion of parthood in terms of the pluralist’s many 
notions of parthood: x is a part of y in the general sense iff x is in any way a part of y. 
Moreover, we can distinguish different notions of part when it is important. 
 
Having set out these assumptions, let’s examine the initial prima facie case against Mutual 




2. The Prima Facie Case Against Mutual Parthood 
As I said above, Mutual Parthood does not seem to be a natural description of coincident 
objects. If we were asked to list the statue’s parts, a natural response would be to list its head, 
its legs, its other anatomical parts, and its microscopic parts.8 If we were reminded that the 
statue also has parts such as its left half and its right half, we might continue our list to 
include such parts. But I don’t think that the clay (or indeed, the lump of clay) would feature 
on this continued list. Of course, one reason for this might be that we think of the clay not as 
a part of the statue, but as all of it. However, for moderate pluralists, that the clay is ‘all’ of 
the statue is straightforwardly compatible with the clay being a part of the statue, since the 
two objects are distinct. Even so, I think our initial verdict is that the clay is not a part of the 
statue. 
 
Regardless of whether we admit that the clay is a part of the statue, there is no inclination, I 
think, to say that the statue is a part of the clay. For one thing, although we think that the 
statue is made out of the clay, we do not think that the clay is made out of the statue. But our 
notions of parthood and being made out of seem to go hand-in-hand - a whole is made out of 
its parts after all (cf. Fine, 2010: 560). Moreover, given Restricted Transitivity, and assuming 
that the statue is a part of the clay, then all of the statue’s parts, such as its nose, are also parts 
of the clay. But, as Baker (2000: 81) puts it: 
 
                                                          
8
 You might deny that a statue of a woman has any anatomical parts. But amongst attested metonymic meaning 
transfers are those that allow us to use terms that properly apply to things represented to apply to 




is it obvious that they [the statue David and the clay of which it is made] 
share all of the same parts? Pretheoretically, I would have thought that 
David had a nose as a part but that [the clay] did not. Part of [the clay] is 
(i.e., constitutes) David’s nose; but [the clay] itself does not have a nose. 




To emphasise Baker's point, although the clay has a part that coincides with the statue's nose, 
the same sorts of reasons that we have for distinguishing between the clay and the statue are 
also reasons for distinguishing between the nose and the portion of clay that is coincident 
with it. So, moderate pluralists need not say that the clay has a nose as a part, once this is 
distinguished from the coincident portion of clay. Moreover, pre-theoretically it seems that 
the only macroscopic parts of aggregates of macroscopically homeomerous stuffs, such as 
portions of clay, are themselves aggregates of such stuffs, thus ruling out the claim that such 
portions have anatomical parts. 
 
The claim that the statue is a part of the clay also conflicts with the following initially 
plausible claim about parthood 
 
1. If x is a complex part of y, and we replace a part of x, z, with w, whilst leaving x in 
place and without destroying y, then x remains a part of y.10 
                                                          
9
 See also Doepke (1982: 16), Fine (2003: 198 n5) and Lowe (2003: 157). 
10
 Perhaps (1), as formulated, is subject to counterexample, but I think that something in the vicinity is correct, 
and that Mutual Parthood violates (1), prima facie tells against Mutual Parthood. Here I want to resist arguments 
for Mutual Parthood, not to consider arguments for other views, but something like (1) underwrites the view that 




This is because we could replace, say, the clay nose of the statue with an alabaster one 
without destroying either the clay or the statue – the clay can survive scattering, and the 
statue can survive a change of nose. But as the statue is no longer a part of the clay, in virtue 
of not being completely made of clay, if the statue was a part of the clay before the 
replacement, then (1) is false. 
 
Finally, if we assume that parthood is transitive, as is standard, Mutual Parthood also yields 
the unintuitive result that the statue and the clay are parts of themselves (remember that I am 
not assuming parthood to be reflexive)! In any case, as well as being initially unappealing, 
the claim that the statue and the clay are mutual parts has at least some revisionary 
consequences. 
 
In §3-§7, I consider and reject five arguments for Mutual Parthood that can be found in the 
literature. Moreover, towards the end of §5, I argue that Mutual Parthood, which is motivated 
by failures of Extensionality, is not a general treatment of such failures, and that the 
mereological principle underlying Mutual Parthood is false. We are thus free to hold on to the 
intuitive picture that rejects Mutual Parthood. In the final two sections I consider arguments 
against Mutual Parthood. First, (§8), I consider and reject an argument that three 
dimensionalists cannot accept Mutual Parthood. Second (§9), I argue that Mutual Parthood is 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
cease to be a part of y: destroy x, destroy y, remove x from y. Now, consider the following case. Dion is a man 
and Theon is that part of him which includes all of his body apart from his left foot. But what happens to the 
relation between Dion and Theon when we destroy Dion's left foot? Assuming that both survive the foot's 
destruction, then if our tripartite claim about ending parthood is correct, then after the operation Theon is a part 
of Dion and coincident with him. 
10 
 




The main case in the literature for Mutual Parthood claims that it is entailed by mereological 
principles that we must accept. It should not be presumed at the outset, however, that there a 
substantive logic of parthood. It may be that given the topic-neutral nature of parthood, there 
are no or very few principles that are universally applicable to the study of parthood. 
Moreover, even if we restrict our attention to material objects it is not clear that there is a 
substantive logic of parthood for such objects. Still, it must be conceded that some principles 
of mereology look initially compelling. We will consider theoretical reasons that bear on 
which mereological principles we should endorse in §5 below. Here, however, I want to 
explore an argument for Mutual Parthood that rests on the intuitive plausibility of certain 
mereological principles. 
 
A standard intuitive principle of mereology is 
 
Strong Supplementation: if x is not a part of nor identical to y, then x or some part of 
it does not overlap y, 
 
where x overlaps y iff x and y are identical or have some common part. 
 
As has been noted before (Crisp and Smith 2005: 327-8, 334-5, Hawthorne, 2006; Hovda 
2013: 257; and Sider, 2001: 155), Mutual Parthood follows from Strong Supplementation 
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given the claim that the statue and the clay completely overlap. That is, the claim that every 
part of the statue overlaps some part of the clay, and vice versa. 
 
One way to see the intuitive pull of Strong Supplementation is to note that it appears to be 
supported by one natural way of thinking about parthood that I call the inclusion model of 
parthood. Consider which, if any, of the three blue circles B, C, and D are parts of the white 
circle with the dashed perimeter, A? Intuitively, B might be a part of A since it is included 
within A's boundaries (whether it is in fact a part of A cannot be deduced from such a 
diagram, since B may merely be contained within A, just as a toy might be contained in a 
box, but assume that B is a part of A). D, on the other hand, is not a part of A, since D is 
excluded by A's boundaries. C, which is neither included nor excluded by A's boundaries is 
also not a part of A, although some part of C, the part of C included by A's boundaries, is a 
part of A. This type of picture, I think, underlies some of our thinking about parthood, at least 







Figure 1: The Inclusion Model of Parthood
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As Fine (2010: 560) puts it, 
 
When one object is a part of another, there is a sense in which it is in the 
other—not in the sense of being enclosed by the other, as when a marble is in 
an urn, but more in the sense of being integral to the other. 
 
It is a virtue of Strong Supplementation that it accords with the inclusion model: C and D are 
not parts of A, and thus have parts that do not overlap A. Contrapositively, B does not have a 
part that does not overlap A, and so is a part of A. So I think Strong Supplementation 
captures part of our initial thinking about parthood. 
 
One might accept Strong Supplementation, however, but resist Mutual Parthood by denying 
that the statue and the clay completely overlap. One way of doing this is to deny that the 
statue and the clay share any parts: the part of the statue that looks like a small piece of clay 
or an atom is in fact a distinct thing that is coincident with the piece of clay/atom. This 
‘duplicate particle’ view is not plausible, however. First, pre-theoretically we think that clay 
statues, as well as having anatomical parts, also have bits of clay as parts – they are made of 
clay (cf. Wasserman, 2002: 199). Second, whilst there are powerful arguments for pluralism 
that seem to require us to accept that manipulating some clay brings a statue into existence, 
we don’t think that such activity also brings into existence a host of particles as well (cf. 
Wasserman, 2002: 199). Relatedly, the arguments that motivate Moderate Pluralism do not 
extend to such small parts. That is, anatomical parts are not individuated as finely as particles, 
and so there will be minimal complex anatomical parts that have only bits of matter as parts 
(see Lowe, 2013). Third, the view is subject to the additivity objection to Moderate 
Pluralism: if the statue and the clay are distinct and yet both weigh 10 kilos, then when we 
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place them on the scales together they should jointly weight 20 kilos, but they don’t. 
Moderate Pluralists who say that the clay and the statue share their matter have a ready-made 
answer – it is in virtue of having matter that these objects have a weight, so if they share their 
matter they also share their weight. We do not calculate the weight of an object by adding the 
weight of all its parts, rather it is by adding the weight of its non-overlapping parts. Similar 
things can be said for other shared properties of the clay and the matter. Finally, if we deny 
that the statue and the clay overlap, then we cannot appeal to the sharing of matter to explain 
coincidence (see §6). 
 
A more promising approach to denying complete overlap allows that the statue and the clay 
share some parts. One way of implementing this strategy would be to claim that whereas the 
statue lacks any material parts that do not overlap the clay, it does have formal parts that do 
not overlap the clay (see Fine, 2008; and Koslicki, 2008). If this is combined with the view 
that the clay does not have such formal parts, then it follows from Strong Supplementation 
that the clay is a part of the statue, but it does not follow that the statue is a part of the clay. 
Further, the resulting picture makes good sense: the statue, but not the clay, is a hylomorphic 
compound of matter and form. So this version of Constituting Parthood, like Mutual 
Parthood, can hold on to Strong Supplementation.11 
 
I want to remain neutral on whether material objects have formal parts, and also on the 
question of whether Constituting Parthood is the best alternative to Mutual Parthood. So, for 
the remainder of the paper, let us assume that the statue and the clay completely overlap. 
Given this, we must either embrace Mutual Parthood, or else reject Strong Supplementation. 
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 A second way of allowing partial but not complete overlap consistent with Strong Supplementation and the 
denial of Mutual Parthood is to posit modal parts (see Graham, 2014; and Wallace, 2014). 
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But as we have seen Strong Supplementation is an initially compelling principle motivated by 
the intuitive inclusion model of parthood. As such, it does not appear that we can simply 
reject the principle. Having said that, if, as I claimed above, Mutual Parthood is itself 
unintuitive, then we have to give up something that we may, initially, want to hold on to. 
 
In any case, we should be wary of accepting Strong Supplementation. First, before we 
consider Mutual Parthood itself, Strong Supplementation has the immediate consequence that 
the statue's head is a part of the clay, which is not obvious. Second, although Strong 
Supplementation looks good, its contrapositive does not look so good when we consider 
cases of coincidence: if x and y completely overlap, then they are mutual parts. This is one 
way of giving voice to the unintuitiveness of Mutual Parthood. Moreover, one might think 
that Strong Supplementation is just too close to the desired conclusion to provide much 
support for it: anyone not inclined to accept Mutual Parthood will not be inclined to accept 
Strong Supplementation, and especially its contrapositive, in full generality. 
 
More importantly, another standard intuitive principle about parthood is 
 
Weak Supplementation: if x is a part of y, then there is some part of y, z, that does not 
overlap x. 
 
It is a virtue of Weak Supplementation, like Strong Supplementation, that it accords with the 
inclusion model: B is a part of A, and thus A has a part - the white bit within the dashed line - 
that does not overlap B. Contrapositively, Weak Supplementation captures the prima facie 
failure of reflexivity for our intuitive notion of parthood, since A does not have a part which 
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does not overlap A, and so A is not a part of A. So I think Weak Supplementation also 
captures part of our ordinary thinking about parthood. 
 
But given our assumption of complete overlap, No Parthood follows from Weak 
Supplementation. Moderate pluralists, then, are committed to rejecting at least one of Strong 
and Weak Supplementation: Mutual Parthood follows from Strong Supplementation but is 
inconsistent with Weak Supplementation. Vice versa for No Parthood.12 
 
It is not clear why the argument from Strong Supplementation to Mutual Parthood and the 
rejection of Weak Supplementation is in any better standing than an analogous argument 
from Weak Supplementation to a rejection of Mutual Parthood and Strong Supplementation. 
Can we break the deadlock? Although Mutual Parthood is not consistent with Weak 
Supplementation it is consistent with the following restricted version 
 
Weak Supplementation*: if x is a part of y and y is not a part of x, then there is some 
part of y, z, which does not overlap x. 
 
Analogously, however, No Parthood (and Constituting Parthood) is consistent with the 
following restricted version of Strong Supplementation 
 
                                                          
12
 In standard mereologies, Weak Supplementation follows from Strong Supplementation given the asymmetry 
of parthood: if x is a part of y, then y is not a part of x. The mutual parts theorist, however, rejects asymmetry, 
and so a commitment to Strong Supplementation does not bring with it a commitment to Weak 
Supplementation. One might take the rejection of asymmetry itself as a reason to reject Mutual Parthood. Fine 
(2010), for instance, takes asymmetry as an important test of when we have a parthood relation. 
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Strong Supplementation*: if x is not a part of nor identical to nor coincident with y, 
then x has some part, z, which does not overlap y. 
 
The mutual parts theorist might say, however, that the status of Weak and Strong 
Supplementation* are not the same. Whereas, Strong Supplementation* concerns some 
cooked-up relation expressed in its antecedent, Weak Supplementation* does concern an 
interesting notion. Cotnoir (2010, 2016) distinguishes between two notions of proper 
parthood: non-identical parthood and parthood with remainder, claiming that Weak 
Supplementation* captures the latter notion. 
 
This response will not convince the Constituting Parthood theorist, for she accepts that the 
clay is a part of the statue and not vice versa, but denies that there is any remainder, and so 
rejects Weak Supplementation*. Such a theorist need not deny that there is an interesting 
notion of parthood with remainder, but only deny that Weak Supplementation* captures this 
notion. To insist otherwise is to beg the question against Constituting Parthood (see also §5). 
 
But what of the No Parthood theorist who, for all we have said, accepts Weak 
Supplementation*? Such a philosopher could reply that Strong Supplementation* is in fact 
telling us about a genuine relation of theoretical interest, the one that is the subject of its 
consequent, namely, overlap. So, unless more can be said, then as far as these 
supplementation principles go, there seems to be no reason to accept Mutual Parthood. 
 
We should note, however, that Constituting Parthood (assuming complete overlap) requires 
the rejection of both Strong and Weak Supplementation (as well as Weak* Supplementation). 
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This, perhaps, gives us a reason to reject Constituting Parthood. Constituting Parthood is, 
however, consistent with the following intuitive principle 
 
Quasi-Supplementation: if x is a part of y, then y has two parts, w and z, such that w 
and z do not overlap, 
 
as are Mutual Parthood and No Parthood. 
 
The three-part inclusion model of parthood above does not distinguish between Strong, 
Weak, and Quasi-Supplementation, all of them being consistent with that model. What cases 
of coincidence show, however, is that these three supplementation principles can come apart. 
And which principles are upheld depends upon how we construe the mereological relation 
between coincident objects. But given that models of distinct coincidents do not themselves 
seem to be part of our pre-theoretical thinking about parthood, it is not clear what to say 
about such cases. So it is not clear which supplementation principles we should accept and 
reject given cases of coincidence. As a result, it is hard to see how an argument based on the 
intuitive status of the above supplementation principles could be decisive. There is, then, no 
quick route from supplementation principles to claims about the mereological relations 
between the statue and the clay. 
 
We'll return to the above supplementation principles in §5, but first I want to consider an 
argument for Mutual Parthood similar to the one above that is presented by Simons (1987: 
228-229), and endorsed by Thomson (1998) and Cotnoir (2013). 
18 
 
4. Mereological Harmony 
Thomson (1998: 155) claims that the following is true when we limit our attention to material 
objects: 
 
2. x is part of or identical to y iff the space occupied by x is part of or identical to the 
space occupied by y. 
 
The right-to-left direction of (2) is 
 
Strong Inclusion: If the space occupied by x is part of or identical to the space 
occupied by y, then x is part of or identical to y. 
 
As Cotnoir notes, 
 
There is a natural attraction to the idea that the structure of locations 
should be in harmony with the structure of parts. [Strong] Inclusion is 
compelling, I think, because it represents one way in which these 
structures may be in harmony (2013: 838). 
 
It is natural to think that the structure of locations are in harmony with the structure of a 
material object’s parts, and Strong Inclusion is prima facie attractive, gaining support from 
the inclusion model of parthood. Mutual Parthood, however, follows from Strong Inclusion 
and the observation that coincident objects occupy identical spaces. One might, with Fine, 
(2003: 197-198), deny the latter claim in full generality: perhaps a loaf of bread occupies a 
region of space that outstrips that occupied by the bread from which it is made, and so neither 
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Strong Inclusion nor (2) entails that the loaf is a part of the bread. Still, Strong Inclusion 
would lead us to conclude that many material coincidents are mutual parts, and this is 
revisionary enough. 
 
The reply to this argument for Mutual Parthood is essentially the response to the argument 
from Strong Supplementation. And that this should be so can be seen by taking the 
contrapositive of Strong Inclusion, 
 
3. If x is not identical to nor a part of y, then the space occupied by x is not identical to 
nor a part of y, that is, the space occupied by x does not completely overlap the space 
occupied by y, 
 
which is very similar to Strong Supplementation. 
 
First, it follows immediately from Strong Inclusion (without considering issues of Mutual 
Parthood or Restricted Transitivity) that the statue's head is a part of the clay. Second, Strong 
Inclusion doesn't seem compelling when we consider cases of coincidence explicitly. Third, 
to the extent that Strong Inclusion is plausible, it seems to be so in virtue of the fact that it is 
entailed by the following principles 
 
 Proper Inclusion: If the space occupied by x is part of the space occupied by y, 
 then x is a part of y. 
 
Spatial Identity: If the space occupied by x is identical to the space occupied by y, 




But we should note that in cases of coincidence, Spatial Identity is false. As such, we cannot 
appeal to it in order to underwrite Strong Inclusion. Of course, Strong Inclusion also follows 
from Proper Inclusion and 
 
Weakened Spatial Identity: If the space occupied by x is identical to the space 
occupied by y, then x is part of or identical to y, 
 
and is in fact equivalent to the conjunction of Weakened Spatial Identity and  
 
Weakened Proper Inclusion: If the space occupied by x is part of the space occupied 
by y, then x is part of or identical to y. 
 
But as we can see, the truth of Weakened Spatial Identity, especially given the falsity of 
Spatial Identity, is so close to begging the question as to be unconvincing.13 
 
Finally, as Cotnoir notes, Strong Inclusion is but one way to ensure harmony. Other ways, 
consistent with rejecting Mutual Parthood, are given by alternative initially attractive 
principles, consistent with the inclusion model of parthood 
 
Weak Inclusion: If x is a part of y, then the space occupied by y has a part, which 
does not overlap the space occupied by x. 
 
                                                          
13
 Similar remarks could be made about Strong Supplementation. 
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Quasi-Inclusion: If x is a part of y, then the space occupied by y has two parts, w and 
z, such that w and z do not overlap. 
 
But whereas Mutual Parthood follows from Strong Inclusion, it is inconsistent with Weak 
Inclusion, and both it and its negation are consistent with Quasi-Inclusion. On the other hand, 
No Parthood follows from Weak Inclusion, is inconsistent with Strong Inclusion, and it and 
its negation are consistent with Quasi-Inclusion. Finally, Constituting Parthood is inconsistent 
with both Strong and Weak Inclusion, although consistent with Quasi-Inclusion. 
 
The three-part inclusion model of parthood does not distinguish between these principles of 
harmony, all of them being consistent with that model. Coincident material objects show that 
these three harmony principles can come apart. And which principles are upheld depends 
upon how we construe the mereological relation between coincident objects. Just as with 
supplementation principles, there is no quick route from harmony to Mutual Parthood. 
 
5. Extensionality and the Theoretical Role of Supplementation Principles 
Although the intuitive case for Mutual Parthood from Strong Supplementation fails, Cotnoir 
(2016) argues that Strong Supplementation provides a theoretical reason for Mutual Parthood. 
In short, he argues that Weak Supplementation is to be rejected, even accepting No Parthood, 
but that any mereology that rejects both Weak and Strong Supplementation is inadequate. 
Therefore, we must maintain Strong Supplementation, and so embrace Mutual Parthood. The 
conclusion only follows if we grant, as the hylomorphist will not, that the clay and the statue 
completely overlap. But as I shall argue, even accepting this assumption, Cotnoir’s argument 




Cotnoir’s argument starts from the observation that coincident objects are putative 
counterexamples to the following mereological principle 
 
 Extensionality: If x and y have parts and have all the same parts, then x=y. 
 
For example, Cotnoir (2010: 397) claims that “it is natural to think that a lump of clay and a 
statue made from it have all the same proper parts”. It will be apparent from §2 that I 
disagree, siding with Baker (2000) et al in thinking that the statue has parts, such as its head, 
that the (lump of) clay does not. But noting this does not get to the heart of the issue, for 
consider the smallest anatomical part of the statue, x,. Now ask whether x and the clay that 
constitutes x falsify Extensionality? Those who embrace Constituting Parthood answer no 
since the clay that constitutes x is a part of x, but not a part of itself. But what about those 
who endorse No Parthood? Since x has no anatomical parts, its parts only being portions of 
clay and their parts, x and its constituting matter share all of their parts and thus do represent 
a counterexample to Extensionality.14 
 
Now, as van Inwagen (1990: 53) notes, Extensionality follows from Strong Supplementation 
and the asymmetry of parthood, since if x and y have all the same parts they are mutual parts 
by Strong Supplementation, and hence identical by asymmetry. So anti-extentionalist 
moderate pluralists must reject at least one of Strong Supplementation and asymmetry. 
Mutual parthood anti-extensionalists deny asymmetry, but hold on to Strong 
                                                          
14
 Further putative counterexamples to Extensionality include Doepke’s (1986) landmark and statue composed 
from the same stone, and Fine’s (1999) variable embodiments with the same manifestations but different 
principles of variable embodiment. 
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Supplementation. But, since other anti-extensionalists reject Strong Supplementation, there is 
no quick argument from the failure of Extensionality to Mutual Parthood.15 
 
Cotnoir (2016), replying to Varzi, argues that there are problems with any anti-extensionalist 
rejection of Strong Supplementation, and so provides a distinct argument for Mutual 
Parthood from the failure of Extensionality. Varzi (2009) argues that 
 
 Universal Fusion: ∀xx ∃y (y is a fusion of xx) 
 
entails Extensionality, where we can think of fusions as what Hovda (2009) calls Type-2 
fusions: y is a fusion of xx =df every one of xx is a part of y, and every part of y overlaps one 
of xx. Given that we here want to be neutral between moderate pluralists who deny 
Extensionality and those who don’t, we must either resist Varzi’s argument or else give up 
Universal Fusion. Although some moderate pluralists deny Universal Fusion, others are 
happy to accept it or some similar principle that Varzi could have appealed to instead.16 
                                                          
15
 Van Inwagen (1990: 53), who himself is not a moderate pluralist, thinks that moderate pluralists should give 
up Strong Supplementation, and in particular should deny that the statue is a part of the lump of clay coincident 
with it. 
16
 Rejecting Mutual Parthood and accepting certain plenitudinous ontologies leads to a hierarchy of material 
objects that is hard to reconcile with Universal Fusion.  Such hierarchies are consistent, however, with Set-sized 
Fusion: for any material objects xx that can be put in a one-to-one correspondence with the members of some 
pure set, there is a fusion of xx. See Goodman (ms) for discussion. Varzi’s argument does not essentially rely on 
Universal Fusion: Set-sized Fusion and similar principles would suffice. Accepting principles such a Universal 
Fusion is consistent with thinking that although ordinary material objects are themselves fusions of their parts, 
they are not unstructured wholes generated by the compositional operation of fusion (see Fine, 2010: 589), that 
the operation of fusion is “one tiny star in a vast mereological firmament” (Fine, 2010: 576) and that objects 
generated by the operation of fusion are “a backwater of ontology” (Johnston, 2006: 637). 
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Cotnoir argues, however, that the only way to be an anti-extensionalist and hold on to 
principles like Universal Fusion is to accept Mutual Parthood. 
 
Following Cotnoir, we can construe Varzi’s argument from Universal Fusion to 
Extensionality as follows. Take some putative counterexample to Extensionality, x and y, and 
consider their fusion, z, which exists by Universal Fusion. x is a part of z that violates Weak 
Supplementation, since there is no part of z disjoint from x, given the complete overlap of x 
and y. But Varzi takes Weak Supplementation to be constitutive of parthood, and so there can 
be no counterexample to Extensionality assuming Universal Fusion. 
 
The only response for anti-extensionalist pluralists who accept Universal Fusion is to deny 
the initially compelling Weak Supplementation. But here we are dealing with a case very 
different from those which guide our ordinary thinking about parthood and which motivated 
Weak Supplementation. Varzi's case concerns the fusion of a pair of coincident objects that, 
assuming such fusions are themselves located, are also coincident with their fusion! So, 
although giving up Weak Supplementation is, perhaps, surprising, we are here considering 
giving it up in this very odd case. Moreover, the fusion of two coincident objects is not one 
that we have any pre-theoretic judgments about. So it seems, then, that the anti-extensionalist 
moderate pluralist can maintain Universal Fusion by giving up Weak Supplementation for the 
fusions of coincident objects. 
 
We should note that no parthood theorists are now in the same position as constituting 
parthood theorists in having to deny both Strong and Weak Supplementation, and also both 
Strong and Weak Inclusion, assuming fusions are located. Furthermore, Cotnoir (2016) 
argues that we cannot simply deny both Strong and Weak Supplementation, since any such 
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mereology is unacceptable. If he is correct, then Constituting Parthood must be rejected, as 
must any no parthood view that denies Extensionality and countenances the fusion of distinct 
coincident objects. Mutual Parthood, on the other hand, is acceptable according to Cotnoir, 
since it validates Strong Supplementation. 
 
Cotnoir argues that in the absence of Weak Supplementation, we need Strong 
Supplementation to rule out certain possibilities allowed by Quasi-Supplementation. In 
particular, although Quasi-Supplementation requires that a complex object, x, has multiple 
disjoint parts, it allows that x has a part y, such that there is no part of x disjoint from y. 
Moreover, there could be a part of y, z, such that no part of y is disjoint from z. And so on, as 
long as there are some parts of x, v and w, such that v and w are disjoint. 
 
Cotnoir claims that 
 
[t]hese structures seem much more akin to set theory, in which there is a 
clear difference between e.g. {{{w, z}}} and {{w, z}}. They are less 
mereologically sound, and they don’t seem to map clearly on to the 
intuitive gloss that ‘an object that has a proper part must have two 
disjoint proper parts’. In any case, strange models of this sort have 
nothing to do with failures of extensionality (Cotnoir, 2016: 126-127).17 
                                                          
17
 Effingham rejects Weak Supplementation on the basis of time-travel cases and like Cotnoir, thinks “[i]t is not 
good enough to simply cast aside principles like [Weak Supplementation] and carry on regardless. [Weak 
Supplementation] is introduced to rule out bizarre scenarios” (2010: 337) i.e the sorts of structures considered 
above. Effingham embraces perdurantism in order to rule out these ‘bizarre scenarios’. What I say in the main 
text in response to Cotnoir applies equally to Effingham’s argument for perdurantism (see also §8 for a 




We can discern three complaints here. First, Cotnoir states that these structures don’t map on 
to the idea that an object that has a part must have two disjoint parts. Given that Quasi-
Supplementation does in fact ensure that any object that has a part, has two disjoint parts, and 
that all the complex objects in the structure described above do have two disjoint parts, 
Cotnoir is mistaken.  
 
Second, Cotnoir complains that we should not allow such structures as they have nothing to 
do with failures of Extensionality. But the kind of plenitudinous ontology of material objects 
posited by e.g. Goodman (ms) leads both to failures of Extensionality and generates the 
structures that Cotnoir objects too. So at least according to such theories, failures of 
Extensionality and the allegedly problematic structures are linked. And as we shall see below, 
there are cases that represent failures of both Extensionality and Strong Supplementation 
 
Cotnoir’s final objection to the above structures consists of the unsupported claim that these 
structures are less mereologically sound. Now we certainly do want to rule out such 
structures in certain cases, but it is not clear that we should rule them out in general. Consider 
the following principle 
 
Collapse: ∑x = x, 
 
where ∑ represents a multigrade compositional operation forming a single whole from any 
number of parts. When ∑ is interpreted as the operation of fusion or summation, then 
Collapse does indeed hold, and this rules out the sorts of structures that Cotnoir wants to 




avoid for objects generated by the operation of fusion. But that fusion obeys collapse does not 
entail that all compositional operations do. As Fine puts it, 
 
the operation of summation is one tiny star in a vast mereological 
firmament, and there is no reason to think of it as possessing better 
mereological credentials than any of the others. It is indeed distinguished 
by the fact that it is blind to all aspects of the whole other than the parts 
from which it was formed. But it is hard to see why sensitivity to structure 
in the other operations should somehow impede their ability to form 
wholes (Fine, 2010: 576). 
 
Not implausibly, Fine (2010) himself takes the ancestral of set membership to be a parthood 
relation that does not obey Collapse and so allows for the kind of structures Cotnoir wants to 
avoid. As Cotnoir provides no argument that such models can't be mereological models we 
can ignore this complaint. 
 
In any case, maintaining Strong Supplementation and embracing Mutual Parthood is not a 
general response to failures of Extensionality, and so Cotnoir (2016: 127) is wrong to think 
that “counterexamples to extensionality ought to be thought of as parts of each other”. This is 
because there are counterexamples to Extensionality that are even less plausibly construed as 
mutual parts than coincident material objects. For example, take the word types 'on' and 'no'. 
These appear to have the same parts 'o' and 'n' and yet there is no inclination to regard these 
words as parts of each other – for one thing their tokens aren’t coincident. One might resist 
this counterexample, by denying that 'o' and 'n' are the only parts of these words, saying that 
'on' but not 'no' has a part comprised of 'o' and the arch of 'n'. But even if plausible in this 
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case, it is not a general response since there are similar counterexamples to Extensionality 
where the parts of the distinct objects are structured in exactly the same way. For example, 
consider the letter ‘a’ and the word ‘a’, the two different lexemes that are both written 'bank', 
or two word-for-word or note-for-note identical, but distinct poems or pieces of music written 
by causally separated artists (for a sketch and a partial defence of the resultant metaphysics, 
see Walters, 2013).18 
 
Some philosophers will doubt these counterexamples to Strong Supplementation. For 
example, Dodd (2007) denies that there can be distinct yet indiscernible pieces of music. But 
such philosophers are mistaken for at least three reasons. 
 
First, as Levinson argues, such artworks may differ with respect to their aesthetic properties, 
and so, by Leibniz’s Law, are distinct works: 
 
A work identical in sound structure with Schoenberg's Pierrot Lunaire 
(1912), but composed by Richard Strauss in 1897 would be aesthetically 
different from Schoenberg's work. Call it 'Pierrot Lunaire*’. As a 
Straussian work, Pierrot Lunaire* would follow hard upon Brahms's 
German Requiem, would be contemporaneous with Debussy's Nocturnes, 
and would be taken as the next step in Strauss's development after Also 
Sprach Zarathustra. As such it would be more bizarre, more upsetting, 
                                                          
18
 Note that single letter words are also counterexamples to Weak Supplementation (and to Weak 
Supplementation*), so Varzi’s claim that Weak Supplementation is constitutive of parthood need not worry the 




more anguished, more eerie even than Schoenberg's work, since perceived 
against a musical tradition, a field of current styles, and an oeuvre with 
respect to which the musical characteristics of the sound structure involved 
in Pierrot Lunaire appear doubly extreme (Levinson 1980: 64). 
 
Second, Levinson notes that (1980: 68 n12) two artists can produce indiscernible works at 
different times. For example, suppose A writes, in the sense of ‘creates’, a poem, P, at time t, 
and that another poet B, who is causally isolated from A, writes a poem, P*, line-for-line 
identical to P at a later time t*. Now B has exhibited the same creative flair as A, so it is 
natural to say that B has also created a poem: it is not plausible to suppose that B discovered 
A’s work since the poems were produced independently. So, if we want to preserve the 
correct creationist thought that A created P and B created P*, then given that P and P* were 
created at different times, and the principle that something cannot be created at two distinct 
times, P≠P*.19 
 
Finally, authors and composers can, it seems, rewrite their works, by producing embodiments 
of the work that differ from previous embodiments with respect to their structural properties. 
So, artworks can change over time. Consider, then, two novels which are created completely 
separately and which, although resembling one another, we would unhesitatingly say are 
distinct. Since these novels can be modified over time by modifying copies or by producing 
copies that differ from their predecessors, then the two novels can come to converge so that 
                                                          
19
 To create x is to bring x into existence. If x is brought into existence at t, then, if x has not gone out of 
existence between t and t*, x cannot also be brought into existence at t*, for, by hypothesis, it already exists. 
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they are mereologically indiscernible. And yet, there are still two of them, since if x is 
distinct from y at one time, x is distinct from y at all times.20 
 
These cases show that not all failures of Extensionality can be treated as cases of Mutual 
Parthood, and that Strong Supplementation fails in general.21 Moreover, the fusion of such 
indiscernible objects shows that Strong Supplementation fails even for fusions. As such, we 
cannot appeal to Strong Supplementation to rule out the sorts of structures Cotnoir objects to. 
If we do wish to rule out such structures in certain cases, we instead have to appeal to the fact 
that the relevant compositional operation obeys Collapse, or that, for the domain in question, 
the following principle holds 
 
Quasi-Supplementation*: if x and y are disjoint parts of z, then for every w not 
identical to z, such that z is a part of w, then there is a u disjoint from z that is also a 
part of w. 
 
Mutual Parthood, then, is not a general response to failures of Extensionality. Moreover, 
Strong Supplementation has to be rejected, and so many of the above considerations for 
Mutual Parthood simply lapse. None of this shows that the statue and the clay are not mutual 
parts, but once we reject Strong Supplementation, there is no pressure to construe cases of 
coincident material objects this way. Of course, Strong Supplementation might hold for 
material objects and their fusions, but given that this principle is not universally valid, even 
                                                          
20
 Gallois (1998) rejects this claim arguing instead for temporary identity. Gallois’ revisionary position is 
untenable, however. See Sider (2001: 165-176) for critical discussion of Gallois. 
21
 They also show that positing formal parts is not a general response to failures of Extensionality, although one 
might posit them in the case of the statue and the clay to account for the grounding problem (cf. Fine, 2008). 
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for fusions, it must be something special about the composition of material objects that 
underwrites this claim. But we have been given no reason to think that the composition of 
material objects is special in this way. Better, then, to retreat to Quasi-Supplementation* or 
Collapse if we want to rule out the structures Cotnoir finds objectionable.22 
 
Let's take stock. Both Strong Supplementation and Weak Supplementation are invalid. 
Appealing to these principles cannot, then, help us decide upon what mereological relations 
hold between coincident objects. Weak Inclusion is inconsistent with both Mutual Parthood 
and Constituting Parthood, and also with the combination of No Parthood and Universal 
Fusion on the assumption that fusions are themselves located. Strong Inclusion, however, is 
consistent with only Mutual Parthood, and is not shown to be invalid by considerations of 
indiscernible distinct artworks, since it is not clear what we should say about their location. 
So with respect to holding on to intuitive principles, then, Mutual Parthood might be thought 
to have the advantage. But as we saw in §4, Strong Inclusion seems too close to Mutual 
Parthood to provide any support for it. And insofar as we want the structures of material 
objects and their locations to be in harmony, we can, for all that has been said, ensure that 
with Quasi-Inclusion. There are no quick, decisive arguments for Mutual Parthood from 
considerations of supplementation principles, or from related principles of harmony. 
 
                                                          
22
 Cotnoir (2010) also resists another argument of Varzi’s (2008) for Extensionality by accepting Mutual 
Parthood. Varzi's argument, however, rests on the following conjecture: moderate pluralists who distinguish 
between the statue and the clay based on consideration C, should also distinguish between any of the statue's 
parts and the underlying stuff based on consideration C as well. But this conjecture is not well-motivated by 
Varzi, nor is it independently plausible (see the discussion of duplicate particles in §3). For these reasons, even 
those who embrace Mutual Parthood should reject Varzi's conjecture. 
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Still, these are not the only considerations offered in favour of Mutual Parthood. In the next 
two sections, I’ll consider arguments from the explanatory role that Mutual Parthood plays in 
a moderate pluralist metaphysics of material objects. 
 
6. Coincidence 
The moderate pluralist thinks that there can be two material objects in the same place at the 
same time. This claim might be initially surprising because it seems to be in the nature of 
material objects to exclude one another. The perdurantist explains coincidence in terms of the 
sharing of parts: when material objects coincide this is in virtue of them sharing temporal 
parts (see §8 for a discussion of temporal parts, perdurance, and persistence). Temporary 
coincidence, then, is temporal overlap, and this is supposed to be analogous to common or 
garden varieties of partially spatially overlapping objects, such as terraced houses, merging 
roads, and, perhaps, conjoined twins. Just as these objects overlap spatially in virtue of 
sharing spatial parts, temporarily coincident objects overlap by sharing temporal parts. This is 
a virtue of the ontology of temporal parts. 
 
How can the moderate pluralist explain coincidence? First, note that although many moderate 
pluralists do not embrace an ontology of temporal parts, moderate pluralism is consistent with 
such an ontology. A moderate pluralist who embraces such an ontology is thus free to explain 
coincidence in the same way that other temporal parts theorists do. Moreover, unlike 
perdurantists who deny Moderate Pluralism, those who embrace both temporal parts and 
Moderate Pluralism can provide the same explanation of cases of permanent coincidence as 
they do of temporary coincidence, namely, that permanent coincidence is simply a matter of 
two objects sharing temporal parts.23 
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Despite the availability of this explanation, many moderate pluralists reject it. How can such 
pluralists explain coincidence? If mutual parts theorists take parthood to be transitive, then 
they will think that the statue and the clay share all of their parts, and so are mereologically 
indistinguishable. Such theorists, then, can give essentially the same explanation of 
coincidence as the temporal parts theorist - coincidence is a case of the sharing of parts: 
 
[the perdurantist thinks that] coincidence is the overlapping of spacetime 
worms, and thus no more objectionable than overlapping roads. But 
given mutual parthood, the enduring tree and [the coincident] aggregate 
[of cellulose molecules] also overlap. Indeed, given mutual parthood the 
overlap is total. [So here] we have an appealing account of why 
aggregates and trees do not ‘crowd each other out’ that appeals to our 
ordinary conception of when material objects do not compete for space 
(Sider, 2001: 155-156). 
 
And this explanation carries over to the case of permanent coincidence too. This, then, might 
be thought a virtue of Mutual Parthood, assuming transitivity. 
 
Can moderate pluralists who reject both Mutual Parthood and temporal parts explain 
coincidence? As we have seen, it is common for moderate pluralists to deny that coincident 
objects share all of their parts: the statue but not the clay has anatomical parts. But despite 
denying that coincident objects share all of their parts, such pluralists, as we have seen, 
typically claim that they do share all of their parts at some level. That is, coincident 
macroscopic objects, such as the statue and the clay, share their matter. But given that it is in 
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virtue of being material that material objects exclude one another when they do, objects that 
share their matter need not – could not! – exclude each other (terraced houses share some of 
their matter, and so do not exclude each other from the regions occupied by their shared 
matter). So there is no difficulty in explaining how there can be coincident objects, if we 
admit that such objects share their matter, regardless of whether they share all of their parts. 
The mutual parts theorist, then, doesn't have any advantage over other moderate pluralists 
when it comes to explaining coincidence.24 
 
7. Constitution 
As we noted above, some moderate pluralists say that the clay constitutes the statue. If 
Mutual Parthood allows for a reduction or an elucidation of constitution that is otherwise 
unavailable, this would provide some reason for accepting this revisionary thesis. It is not 
clear, however, that such a reduction would be sufficient to motivate Mutual Parthood, since 
this economy in ideology would come at the cost of revising our ordinary conception of the 
statue and the clay. In any case, I shall argue that Mutual Parthood has no advantage over its 
rivals. 
 
The first appeal to Mutual Parthood made in this vein is Thomson’s (1983: 218 n11) attempt 
at defining constitution: 
 
                                                          
24
 Simons (1987: 228) claims that mereological indistinguishability "makes it easier to explain community of 
properties [of coincidents], since many physical properties, such as weight, shape, size, colour and volume, are 
determined by the nature and distribution of a continuant's parts". But these properties are also determined by 
the nature and distribution of an object's matter, and so coincident material objects are indistinguishable with 
respect to these properties regardless of whether they are mereologically indistinguishable. 
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4. x constitutes y =df x and y are mutual parts.25 
 
But whereas the relation of constitution is asymmetric, the relation of mutual parthood is 
symmetric. What is needed is a way of accounting for the fact that whereas the clay 
constitutes the statue, the statue does not constitute the clay, and (4) does not provide this. In 
response to this worry, Thomson (1998: 157) modifies her account of constitution as follows 
 
5. x constitutes y =df (a) x and y are mutual parts, (b) x has an essential part z such that 
neither z nor any part of z is essential to y, and (c) it is not the case that: y has an 
essential part z such that neither z nor any part of z is essential to x. 
 
In order for Thomson’s reduction of constitution to be the basis of an argument for Mutual 
Parthood, there cannot be an equally good reduction of constitution available to those who 
deny Mutual Parthood. But this has not been established. Moreover, Lowe (2013), who 
subscribes to Constituting Parthood, provides the following alternative mereological account 
of constitution: 
 
6. x constitutes y =df (a) x and y coincide materially, (b) every part of x and x itself is a 
part of y, but not every part of y is a part of x, and (c) x and y do not both stand in the 
foregoing relation to a third object, z (Lowe, 2013: 146).26 
                                                          
25
 Here and below we are only interested in material constitution, the putative relation that holds between the 
clay and the statue. 
26
 Whereas Lowe speaks of x and y coinciding spatially, I speak of them coinciding materially (see n2). Lowe's 
(2013) adoption of Constituting Parthood is not well-motivated. Lowe (2003) initially accepting Weak 
Supplementation, embraced No Parthood. Lowe (2013), however, gives up Weak Supplementation since he 




Let us assume that Lowe’s account is extensionally correct, which seems initially plausible 
assuming Constituting Parthood, because whereas x is a part of y, x is not a part of itself. It 
then seems that we are free to endorse Lowe’s (2003: 157 n20) claim that Thomson ‘makes it 
part of her definition – quite implausibly and unnecessarily, to my mind – that if x constitutes 
y at t, then x is part of y at t and y is part of x at t’. So, for all that has been said, Mutual 
Parthood has no advantage over Constituting Parthood. No Parthood theorists, however, 
cannot embrace (6): on such a view anatomically simple objects share all of their parts with 
their constituting matter. In any case, I shall now argue that anyone can appeal to the benefits 
of Thomson's account of constitution, not only mutual parthood theorists. 
 
Before presenting her account of constitution above, Thomson (1998: 155) writes that “surely 
x constitutes y at t only if x and y occupy the same space at t - thus only if x is part of y at t 
and y is part of x at t”. No Parthood and Constituting Parthood are consistent with Thomson’s 
initial claim, but not her inference from coincidence to Mutual Parthood. Once we notice this, 
however, we can simply replace Thomson’s reference to mutual parts in her definition of 
constitution with the claim that x and y are coincident. Although, given that we are 
distinguishing between spatial and material coincidence, it is material coincidence that is of 
relevance here. This, then, gives the following account of constitution: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Lowe that Weak Supplementation is not valid, this alone is not sufficient to motivate Constituting Parthood. 
Lowe's (6) is certainly better than his previous attempt to define constitution for no parthood theorists (2003: 
157, 2013: 131): x is constituted by y =df x and y coincide spatially and every part of y is a part of x but not 
every part of x is a part of y, since such a definition fails for the smallest anatomical parts of x. But as I argue 
below, No Parthood is consistent with an account of constitution that is as good as (5) and (6). 
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7. x constitutes y =df (a) x and y are materially coincident, (b) x has an essential part z 
such that neither z nor any part of z is essential to y, and (c) it is not the case that: y 
has an essential part z such that neither z nor any part of z is essential to x. 
 
Indeed, Wasserman (2004: 695) gives (7) as Thomson's analysis of constitution. Given (7), 
we can see that Mutual Parthood plays no essential role in a Thomson-like reduction of 
constitution. 
 
One might object, however, that whereas Thomson provides a purely mereological reduction, 
I (and Lowe) have to rely on the notion of material coincidence as well. But material 
coincidence can itself be elucidated in mereological terms: x and y are materially coincident 
iff (i) x and y have material parts, (ii) every material part of x overlaps some material part of 
y, and (iii) every material part of y overlaps some material part of x. As a result, the argument 
from the reduction of constitution fails to support Mutual Parthood.27 
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 See Wasserman (2004) for a discussion of definitions of constitution. Wasserman objects to Thomson’s (5). 
First, he claims that persons are not identical to their bodies and that bodies constitute persons. But even if we 
accept that persons are distinct from their bodies, which Thomson (1997) denies, one might claim that persons 
are constituted only by their matter. Second, Wasserman claims that it is possible for an extended simple to 
constitute a statue. But if one is a moderate pluralist, as Thomson is, only because statues, but not their matter 
can change their parts, there would be no reason not to identify the simple and the statue. In any case, the notion 
of extended simple is not obviously coherent. Sider (2001: 155 n13) objects to (5) on different grounds: “it is 
not clear that the definition will even apply to all cases of coincidence [for in some cases] the coinciding objects 
are equally strongly tied to their parts, since they are of the same kind”. But here Sider conflates coincidence 
and constitution. What Thomson is offering is a characterization of constitution, not of coincidence. The kinds 
of same kind coincidence that Sider points to would only cause problems for (5) if these same-kind coincidents 
stand in the constitution relation. See Spolaore (2012) for a discussion of same-kind coincidence and further 




Having considered and rejected five considerations in favour of Mutual Parthood, in the final 
two sections, we'll consider two arguments against Mutual Parthood. 
 
8. Persistence 
Typically, those who embrace Moderate Pluralism are three-dimensionalists, that is, they say 
that material objects are ‘wholly present’ at any moment at which they exist. Four-
dimensionalists, on the other hand, say that material objects occupy time in the way they 
occupy space. Can we make these views more precise? Following Sider (2001: 59), let’s offer 
a characterization of four-dimensionalism in terms of perdurance:28 
 
First, say that x is an instantaneous temporal part (ITP) of y at t iff (i) x 
exists at, but only at, t; (ii) x is part of y at t; (iii) x overlaps at t everything 
that is part of y at t. Second, say that x perdures iff for every time t at which 
x exists, there is an ITP of x at t. 
 
Three-dimensionalists are then taken to say that material objects endure, that is, to deny that 
objects perdure in this sense. But can three-dimensionalists give a positive characterization of 
endurance? Sider argues they cannot. A natural attempt to capture endurance is 
 
Endurance 1: an object, x, endures iff x lacks ITPs. 
                                                          
28
 The main difference between this and Sider's own formulation of perdurance are (i) that I characterize what it 
is for an individual object to perdure and (ii) that I do so in non-modal terms. I prefer my less committal 
formulation because it is not clear why modal considerations are relevant to how an object in fact persists, and 
also because some arguments for perdurance rest on contingencies, thus supporting only a non-modal 




Sider, however, argues that Endurance 1 is inadequate. Consider a portion of clay that is 
moulded into a statue and then instantly destroyed. Sider claims that in such cases endurance 
cannot be captured by Endurance 1 since, for moderate pluralist endurantists, the clay and the 
statue are parts of each other, and so the clay has an instantaneous temporal part, namely the 
statue. Sider thinks the moderate pluralist must accept the mutual parthood of the clay and the 
statue because of the argument from Strong Supplementation that we discussed and rejected 
in §3. Still, Sider's instantaneous statue does mean that Endurance 1 is not a satisfactory 
account of endurance for mutual parts theorists, since they will accept that the clay has an 
ITP. 
 
The obvious response for the mutual part theorist is to endorse 
 
Endurance 2: an object, x, endures iff x lacks an ITP which x is not itself a part of. 
 
Endurance 2 allows the mutual parts theorist to accept the possibility of Sider's instantaneous 
statue, but insists that the clay endures since although it has an ITP, it does not have an ITP it 
is not itself a part of. 
 
There is, however, an apparent problem for the mutual parts theorist: given that an object is 
coincident with any of its ITPs, Mutual Parthood entails that a material object and any of its 
ITPs are mutual parts. As a result, Endurance 2 is consistent with an object having temporal 
parts of the sort the perdurantist posits. That is, Endurance 2 is consistent with our 
characterization of perdurance. As such, Endurance 2 appears to be an inadequate 
characterization of endurance for mutual parts theorists. Moreover, Magidor (Forthcoming) 
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has used this fact to argue that Mutual Parthood cannot, in general, be an account of 
coincidence for three-dimensionalists that want to avoid perdurance. One might think, then, 
that this tells against Mutual Parthood. I shall argue it does not. 
 
Let ‘liberalism’ be the view that for any set of spacetime points that are occupied, there is a 
material object that occupies exactly those points. Liberalism entails that there is an 
instantaneous object located exactly where my desk is. Let's call these objects 'Short Desk' 
and 'Desk' respectively. Magidor then argues as follows 
 
This model of co-location [Mutual Parthood] will not do for current 
purposes: if Short Desk is part of Desk at t, then by definition, Short 
Desk will be an ITP of Desk at t. Generalising, if we combine liberalism 
with the mutual-parthood model of co-location we get perdurantism 
(Magidor, Forthcoming). 
 
That is, given liberalism, we are committed to there being, for every moment at which the 
desk exists, an instantaneous object that is coincident with the desk. But given Mutual 
Parthood, the desk and these objects will be mutual parts. So for every moment at which the 
desk exists, it has an ITP. And so, given a Sider-style characterization of perdurance, Desk 
perdures (it also endures according to Endurance 2). So Mutual Parthood plus liberalism 
entails perdurance (see also Sider, 2001: 157). The problem for Mutual Parthood is that a 
liberal three-dimensionalist seems coherent. 
 
How could the mutual parts theorist respond to this argument? Note that they cannot simply 
give up Mutual Parthood as a general model of coincidence: Short Desk and Desk are mutual 
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parts of each other by Strong Supplementation and by Strong Inclusion, the principles that lie 
at the heart of the mereology of Mutual Parthood. And although we saw that Strong 
Supplementation was in general invalid, mutual parthood theorists will want to hold on to it, 
as well as Strong Inclusion, in the case of material objects. So whether objects like Short 
Desk are parts of Desk or not, Mutual Parthood, it appears, faces problems. 
 
There is, however, something odd about this argument. Hawthorne (2006) is a liberal three-
dimensionalist who accepts Mutual Parthood. But if the argument above is correct, 
Hawthorne's position is incoherent. Now Hawthorne realizes that his position entails 
perdurantism about material objects. Indeed, part of the point of his discussion is to show that 
three-dimensionalism is consistent with an ontology of ITPs. To maintain consistency, 
Hawthorne provides an alternative account of three- and four-dimensionalism.29 It is 
controversial whether the sort of account of three-dimensionalism Hawthorne provides is 
adequate (Giberman, 2014), but we need not settle that here. For liberal mutual parthood 
theorists can reject four-dimensionalism even when that claim is formulated in terms of ITPs. 
To see this, consider David Lewis's setting-up of the endurantist/perdurantist debate: 
 
Let us say that something persists iff, somehow or other, it exists at 
various times; this is the neutral word. Something perdures iff it persists 
by having different temporal parts, or stages, at different times, though 
no one part of it is wholly present at more than one time; whereas it 
                                                          
29
 We should note that Magidor is aware of this. Magidor is not arguing that liberal three-dimensionalists cannot 
accept Mutual Parthood. Rather, she is concerned with whether they are committed to perdurance which is her 
focus. Sider, on the other hand, does appear to endorse the argument from liberalism to four-dimensionalism, 
because he both accepts Strong Supplementation and a mereological conception of four-dimensionalism. 
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endures iff it persists by being wholly present at more than one time 
(Lewis 1986: 202). 
 
Lewis's characterization of perdurance is similar to Sider's, but as Wasserman (2016) has 
recently reminded us, it is also importantly different. Whereas Sider's formulation is an 
ontological one, perdurance being characterized in terms of the existence of ITPs, Lewis's is 
an explanatory one, characterized in terms of persistence in virtue of the having ITPs. The 
difference can be made clear by noting that it is consistent with Sider's definition, but not 
Lewis's, to "take facts about temporal parts to be grounded in facts about temporal 
continuants, rather than vice versa. This would be a view on which temporal wholes are more 
basic than temporal parts" (Wasserman, 2016: 245 n7). 
 
Further, as Wasserman emphasises, perdurance is supposed to be a theory of persistence, and 
as such is supposed to explain persistence. But an ontological account of perdurance, such as 
Sider's does not do this. In any case, for our purposes the point to note is that liberal 
endurantism combined with Mutual Parthood does not entail perdurance on Lewis's 
conception, and so Mutual Parthood is still an option as a model of coincidence for the liberal 
three-dimensionalist. Still, liberal endurantism combined with Mutual Parthood does entail 
that some enduring material objects have ITPs at every moment they exist, and so in this way, 
perhaps, do not contrast with perduring events. 
 
I do not think, however, the fact that an object perdures in Sider's sense is a worry for a three-
dimensionalist. To see this, note that a similar complaint can be levelled against Constituting 
Parthood. There could, for instance, be an instantaneous portion of clay, in virtue of there 
being a single instantaneous clay molecule (I'm assuming portions of clay have such parts 
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essentially, cf. Thomson, 1998: 156) that is coincident with a statue. According to 
Constituting Parthood, this statue would then have an ITP, this instantaneous portion of clay. 
Further, if we accept either that matter is instantaneous or that there could have been a statue 
that is serially and exhaustively constituted by a sequence of instantaneous portions of clay, 
then Constituting Parthood entails that such a statue perdures in something like Sider's 
sense.30 Moreover, there is some sense in which the statue persists by having different 
temporal parts at different times, by being constituted by different instantaneous portions of 
clay at different times. As such the statue would perdure in Lewis’s sense too. 
 
The three-dimensionalist who accepts Constituting Parthood could accept that statues 
constituted successively by distinct instantaneous portions of matter are four-dimensional but 
that most ordinary material objects are three-dimensional. But such a conclusion would only 
be warranted if the characterization of four-dimensionalism in terms of perdurance is 
adequate, but why think that? Why not, instead, think that these cases represent a 
counterexample to any account of four-dimensionalism in terms of ITPs? After all, I don't see 
why anyone should be committed to saying that a statue that is constituted successively by a 
sequence of instantaneous portions of clay persists in a different way to other statues, even if 
they do think that the portion is a part of the statue. Rather, given certain theses about 
parthood, it seems that an account of four-dimensionalism in terms of ITPs fails to capture 
what was wanted - even accepted that the statue has ITPs, this doesn't seem to settle the 
question of whether it occupies time in the way it occupies space. So I think it is not an 
objection to Constituting Parthood that even three-dimensionalists have to allow that some 
                                                          
30
 Goodman (ms) argues that perdurantism characterized a la Sider is equivalent to the claim that all matter is 




material objects perdure in either Sider’s or Lewis's sense. And the same goes for Mutual 
Parthood. 
 
Thomson (1983: 213) herself, a three-dimensionalist who accepts Mutual Parthood, thinks 
the ontology of temporal parts is a crazy metaphysic, whether or not such parts are prior to 
material objects (1983: 211). As a result she will have to reject liberalism, even though she 
accepts other plenitudinous principles such as Universal Fusion. To be fair, she does already 
reject liberalism because it means objects keep popping in and out of existence (1983: 213). 
Nevertheless, she is happy to divide a region of filled space into arbitrary objects, so why not 
a region of spacetime? As Fine (2006) notes, we need not think of operations that generate 
objects as always being compositional: there can be decompositional generative operations 
too one example being the 
 
generative operation, /, of segmentation which, in application to a material 
thing x and a spatio-temporal extension R, will result in the restriction x/R of 
the object x to R (assuming that there is such an object). Segmentation 
generalizes the familiar idea of a time-slice or temporal part, the temporal parts 
of a thing being the special case in which the restriction is to an instantaneous 
slice of space-time (Fine, 2010: 585; see also Johnston, 2006 on principles of 
unity and principles of division). 
 
Three-dimensionalists, regardless of their conception of the mereological relations between a 
statue and its matter, are free to accept such decompositional operations. Nevertheless, 
moderate pluralists who accept that material objects have temporal parts cannot think of 
three-dimensionalism in simple mereological terms. But notice, again following Wasserman, 
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that neither Endurance 1 nor 2 provides a theory of persistence; these claims do not explain 
how objects persist. Even if it is true that material objects lack temporal parts, this is not to 
say how they persist. (Similarly, to deny that material objects perdure in Lewis's sense is not 
to say how they persist.) So regardless of how moderate pluralists construe the mereological 
relation between the clay and the statue, they do not yet have a theory of persistence for 
enduring objects. 
 
Three-dimensionalists could follow Lewis in providing an explanatory conception of 
endurance: an object endures iff it persists by being wholly present at the times at which it 
exists. But this raises an important question: what is it to be wholly present? As Wasserman 
notes, most of the natural answers turn out to be problematic. One approach is just to deny 
perdurance: 
 
8. x is wholly present at t = df x exists at t, but not by having an INT at t. 
 
But as Wasserman complains, this leads to a circular non-explanatory conception of 
endurance, since an object endures iff it persists by being wholly present at the times at which 
it exists, which by (8) amounts to saying an object endures iff it persists by persisting but not 
by having temporal parts.  
 
Wasserman concludes that 
 
Rather than trying to formulate endurantism as a theory of persistence, we 
can instead formulate it as a denial. In particular, we can take endurantism 
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to be the view that objects do not persist through time by having different 
temporal parts at different times (Wasserman, 2016: 248). 
 
No Parthood and Mutual Parthood endurantists are free to adopt Wasserman's suggestion, or 
instead take 'wholly present' as primitive, taking (8) not as a definition but as a biconditional 
elucidating 'wholly present', and so offer an explanatory conception of endurance as 
persistence by being wholly present. Given the possibility of a statue serially constituted by a 
sequence of instantaneous portions of clay, it is not clear that Constituting Parthood theorists 
can embrace such an account. But rather than thinking of this as a disadvantage of the view, it 
seems that one might instead take this to illustrate the inadequacy of capturing the intuitive 
distinction in terms of ITPs. 
 
The approach here is thus consonant with Fine (2006) who rejects a mereological approach, 
and takes as primitive the distinction between how material objects are present in space and 
time. Any scepticism as to the legitimacy of the distinction from the four-dimensionalist can 
be answered, not in terms of a reductive account of the two types of presence, but rather by 
arguing, as Fine does, that  
 
there are a number of considerations which strongly suggest that the distinction 
is to be understood and applied in just the way the 3D-er thinks. Some of these 
considerations concern our use of locative expressions in ordinary language, 
some our conception of composite objects, and some our conception of changing 
composition; and in each case, it is only the 3D-er's point of view that is able to 




9. Mereological Essentialism 
Although considerations of persistence do not tell against Mutual Parthood as a general 
model of coincidence, it is not clear that Mutual Parthood can give a universal account of 
coincidence. Consider a statue, S, made of a portion of clay C, at t1. Let us change the parts 
of the statue, by adding parts to S, without destroying S itself, so that at t2 S and C are no 
longer coincident. At t2, S is not a part of C because S has parts that do not overlap C. But if 
S is not a part of C at t2, then, we might argue, S was not a part of C at t1 because portions of 
clay have their parts invariantly (and essentially). A modal version of the argument shows 
that no object that can survive a change in its parts is a part of its constituting matter. As 
such, Mutual Parthood is false. 
 
The only realistic line of response, I think, is to deny the claim that portions of matter have 
their parts invariantly and essentially. I don't think this is particularly plausible when we 
consider the parts of C that are themselves portions of clay (cf. Thomson's, 1998: 156 Portion 
of Clay Principle). But the argument above needs something stronger than that and the 
defender of Mutual Parthood might reply that insofar as we think portions of clay have their 
parts essentially, it is because we are focusing only on their clay parts. I agree, but this is 
because we do not think portions of clay have statues as parts in the first place. In any case, 
could there not be objects that have all of their parts essentially? Traditionally, this is how 
mere fusions, objects generated by the operation of fusion, have been conceived, I think. 
.And what independent reason have we for denying that there could be such objects once we 
accept, with defenders of Mutual Parthood such as Cotnoir, Hawthorne, and Thomson, a 
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plenitudinous ontology?31 The advocate of Mutual Parthood, then, must deny our intuitive 
picture of portions of matter. 
 
10. Conclusion 
The claim that a statue and its constituting matter are mutual parts lacks any pre-theoretic 
support, and indeed has counterintuitive consequences. Given this, only the most compelling 
arguments for Mutual Parthood should convince us to take the view seriously. We have 
considered five arguments from the literature for Mutual Parthood and found them all 
wanting. And although we argued that there is no route from considerations of the persistence 
of material objects to the falsity of Mutual Parthood, we have argued that at least some 
counterexamples to Extensionality, such as indiscernible poems, require an approach distinct 
from, and which undermines the arguments for, Mutual Parthood as a model of failures of 
Extensionality. Moreover, if there are mere fusions that have all of their parts essentially, 
then Mutual Parthood is false. We are free, then, to stick to our initial reaction that the statue 
is not a part of the clay that constitutes it, and have provided some theoretical considerations 
in support of it.32 
 
                                                          
31
 Similar remarks could be made concerning Fine’s (1999) variable embodiments that are governed by well-
defined postulates. 
32
 I presented an earlier version of this paper at the University of Southampton, and I am grateful to the audience 
(my colleagues). Thanks also to Earl Conee, Craig French, Anil Gomes, Nick Jones, Ian Philips, and Kurt 
Sylvan for comments and discussion. I am especially grateful to an anonymous referee for Noûs for a number of 
constructive and helpful suggestions that led to significant improvements in the paper. Thanks also to the 
Central European University's Institute of Advanced Study for a fellowship that provided a most productive 
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